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Large-scale awareness of the link between artisanal mining and the
continuation of the armed con ict in eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) began to develop at the end of the  rst decade of the
2000s (Nest 2011). Armed groups were said to control mine sites and
their production in order to  nance their military operations, fuelling the
continuation of con ict. In order to break the supposed link between
natural resources and con ict, a large variety of con ict mineral
initiatives began to emerge around 2010 with the ambition of improving
transparency in extracting and trading minerals’  ow (Cuvelier et al.
2014). Examples of these initiatives include the ITRI Tin Supply-chain
initiative (iTSCi) which provides a means of determining the origin of
3T  and documenting the trading chain for these minerals by ‘tagging
and bagging’ their loads near miners’ shafts at counting o ces
(comptoirs) and in mineral depots, before the minerals are exported
through the international market.
This blog explores an under-documented dimension of Congo’s mineral
governance: the ‘Basket Fund’, in other words, the revenues gathered
from mining operators, i.e. mining cooperatives, entités de traitement
(processing entities), middlemen and mineral transporters. The Basket
Fund aims to  nance development projects for grass-roots mining
communities. Based on qualitative data gathered in the South-Kivu
province from June 2018 to May 2019, this blog argues that the Basket
Fund has become a tool for ‘business reform’ in the mining landscape.
Due to their political in uence and through tortuous and predatory
budgetary practices of embezzlement, the provincial state authorities
involved in managing the Basket Fund are seen to derive various
personal bene ts, including political positioning, while sti ing the
development of the mining communities concerned.
Zombe: Tin mining site in Mwega territory. Credit: Claude Iguma
Wakenge.
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The short-lived span of the Basket
Fund  
The creation of the Basket Fund started from the failure of the
Congolese state to enforce fully  scal autonomy of provinces.
According to the 2002 mining law (Article 242), royalties paid by
extractive companies to the national treasury are distributed as follows:
60% contribute to the functioning of the central government in
Kinshasa, and respectively 25% and 15% are allocated to decentralised
provinces and territories where extractive companies are established. In
addition, according to article 175 of the 2006 constitution, the provinces
are allowed to keep 40% of the national tax revenues right away
(‘retenue à la source’).
However, all of these legal provisions have never been enforced, mainly
due to a lack of political will by the national government. In 2012,
provincial governments of Maniema, North and South-Kivu — where
iTSCi is in force — set up the Comité Provincial de Suivi (CPS or
provincial follow-up committee). Presided over by the provincial
ministries of mines and composed of state government o cials, civil
society organisations and mining operators, the CPS is led by a
coordinateur technique (or technical coordinator) who aims to monitor
artisanal mining activities in each province. In response to the inability
of the Congolese state to redistribute the revenues from the extractive
sector to lower-level echelons, the provincial governments of the three
provinces instituted the Basket Fund. The Basket Fund thus resulted
from an ad hoc policy arrangement between provincial authorities, civil
society organisations and these operators who also participated in its
management. It was a voluntary contribution worth $180/tonne of 3T
exported, whereby mining cooperatives contributed $30; middlemen
contributed $50; processing entities contributed $75 and mineral
transporters contributed $25.
Yet, following a provision (Articles 285 and 414) of the Congolese
mining code (renewed in 2018) which stipulates that mining operators
are required to pay 3 % from their annual turnover as a contribution to
local development projects, on 1  February 2019, the National Minister
of Mines, Martin Kabwelulu Labilo, banned the Basket Fund collection in
the three provinces concerned.
Between 2013 and 2018, the total payments collected in the Basket
Fund amounted to nearly $1,692,000. Of this amount, $362,000 (21.3%)
was allocated to  nance development projects (e.g. schools, health
centres, bridges, community halls etc.) in targeted localities where
mining activities took place. To some extent, such investments which
never existed before may challenge the widespread conviction that
‘mining has so often delivered adverse social, environmental and
economic effects for the many, but signi cant gains only for the few’
(Bebbington et al. 2008). And yet, even though the
constructed/renovated infrastructures have been useful for the
communities concerned, one may wonder: what happened to the
remaining $1,330,000?
Predation, power games and
politisation
The following section discusses three main  ndings of this study.
1. Unforeseen predatory practices
The creation of the Basket Fund resulted from a mutual agreement
between the entities involved. Yet, I argue that its everyday
management resulted in unforeseen practices. As one respondent in
Bukavu asserts: “Provincial state authorities of South-Kivu are very
powerful. They are able to design, legalise and change the agreement
on the Basket Fund management without the consent of the other
st
entities involved.” (Interview with civil society members, 20 February
2019).
Some events provide evidence to this claim. In September 2014, the
Governor of South-Kivu, Marcellin Cishambo Ruhoya, probably in search
for popularity, tried to use the amount collected in the Basket Fund to
 nance the construction of a football stadium at Nyantende, near his
native village. His attempt did not succeed due to the opposition of
representatives from the civil society. In March 2018, Apollinaire Bulindi,
the provincial minister of mines unsuccessfully plotted to empty the
Basket Fund coffer, before he was ousted from the provincial
government of South-Kivu. In July 2018, the CPS Coordinateur
technique, Bundia Bulia Eloi, claimed $58,000 for the payment of a new
Jeep Land-Cruiser for the purpose of supervising mining sites. From
this payment, the leakage of approximately $18,000 could hardly be
unnoticed because the same vehicle is worth only $40,000. These
examples suggest that state authorities were not eager to promote
development projects in mining communities. Rather, the Basket Fund
was seen as an opportunity for personal enrichment.
2. State encroachment on the Basket Fund
The Basket Fund was a solution to state failure in resource-revenue
redistribution. Ironically, provincial state authorities (e.g. the provincial
minister of mines) presided over the CPS and participated in the Basket
Fund management. This ‘revival’ of the state through the Basket Fund
has provided room of manoeuvre for these authorities to use their
power in controlling the functioning of the CPS and the Basket Fund
collected. For instance, no meeting gathering CPS members could be
held without the presence of the provincial minister of mines. In
September 2018, the head of the Governor Cabinet, Nicaise Cikuru
Munyiogwara, signed a decree (No. 18/036/GP/SK) which promoted
Bundia Bulia Eloi as the coordinator (not coordinateur technique) of the
CPS and, at the same time, a counsellor of the Governor of South-Kivu,
Claude Nyamugabo Bazibuye, in charge of mining governance. As the
governor’s head of cabinet is not entitled to issue such a decree, mining
operators and civil society representatives suspected this strategic
promotion as a way of facilitating money leakage from the Basket Fund.
Thus, con ict broke out between them and state authorities. Mining
operators and civil society representatives suspended their
participation in the CPS meetings.
The large reach of state authorities is also illustrated through the ban of
the Basket Fund by the National Ministry of Mines. One respondent
observed that: “If the Basket Fund was instituted after consultation by
all the entities involved, its ban should also result from another
consultation” (Interview with mining cooperative members, Bukavu,
6.3.2019). I argue that the opaque role of state authorities in steering
the CPS, in managing and banning the Basket Fund distorts the impact
of this  nancial bailout for the development of mining communities.
3. Politisation
Contrasting with the idea of promoting local development, state
authorities often used the Basket Fund projects to convey political
messages. In a context where the state is dysfunctional and unable to
perform its basic functions (Trefon 2004), such messages can be read
as a strategy of state legitimation. Beyond the fact that the reforms of
the extractive sector have become a business in economic terms, this
business is also political. For example, on 23 June 2017, at the
unveiling of the polyvalent hall built at Nyamukubi (Kalehe), Claude
Nyamugabo Bazibuhe stated that the hall was an achievement of his
provincial government. He thus invited the local population to support
this government, as well as his political mentors in Kinshasa. The same
speech was recited at Shabunda-centre on 10 August 2018 during the
opening ceremony of rehabilitation of the Pont Yuyu. In short, provincial
state authorities were using the inauguration of projects  nanced by the
Basket Fund as an opportunity to show up and to gather popular
support. I argue that, although these projects gained the support from
state authorities, their selection and implementation resulted from joint
efforts by both the mining operators and civil society representatives,
more than by these authorities as such.
Conclusions and policy
recommendations
Beyond what may be wilful attempts at promoting development
projects in mining communities, there is no doubt that the management
of the Basket Fund has become a source of personal enrichment and
political positioning by state elites. Geenen and Cuvelier (2018) come to
similar evidence, arguing that the Congolese elites are able to reposition
themselves and to adapt to changes in the political economy of the
extractive sector. This argument is consistent with Pierre Englebert’s
remark that: ‘When considering what could plausibly be done to launch
the country on a path of shared growth and development, one must
keep in mind the central role of the state in the problem’ (Englebert
2014: 13).
As noted above, the renewed Congolese mining code makes it clear
that mining operators are required to pay 3% as a contribution to local
development projects (Dotation pour la contribution aux projets de
développement communautaire). This is to be levied from their annual
turnover. It is also foreseen to set up a specialised cell with the
mandate of collecting and managing the amount collected. As this blog
as shown, there is a serious risk that such an amount is embezzled and
does not reach the state coffer. This study’s conclusions and policy
recommendations can be summarised as follows:
1. Reduce the role of the state
State o cials have strategised to use large chunks of the Basket Fund
for their personal interests. This may also be the case for the Dotation
pour la contribution aux projets de développement communautaire. I
argue that, although the mining code has envisioned that this dotation
can be more inclusive than the Basket Fund which was collected in only
three provinces, an equal redistribution of mining revenues can bene t
to local communities if the role of state is reduced, i.e. in presiding over
this specialised cell. This suggests giving more decisional power to civil
society organisations who have been battling to create more
transparency in the mining sector.
2. Formalise public–private cooperation
The case of the CPS/Basket Fund shows that next to the state, the
private sector (mining operators) and civil society organisations have
also extended their involvement in mining governance. By and large, the
cooperation between participants in this tripartite have yielded some
positive changes following the implementation of projects targeting
some mining communities. However, this tripartite and their clauses of
cooperation seem to be informal, in other words based on ad hoc
arrangements, rather than a formalised process. One lesson to be
drawn from the CPS/Basket Fund’s experience is that there is a need to
set-up solid railings in order to make this policy e cient.
3. Support local governance
The collection and management of the Basket Fund has certainly left its
mark on the development of mining communities (through speci c
projects) and rede ned the role of mining operators therein. This
research demonstrates that the implementation of such projects does
not necessarily mean that governance practices have improved or that
the local populations are fully represented in their choice and set up.
Excluding the local populations has resulted in the (dys)functioning of
CPS, a network-like structure economically bene tting provincial elites.
In the years to come, policymakers should support initiatives that try to
involve local bene ciaries of the Dotation pour la contribution aux
projets de développement communautaire in the management of such
a dotation. In short, the impetus for socio-economic change in line with
resources redistribution must stem from the ground-up who stand to
gain from such a redistribution.
1 The abbreviation « 3T » refers to three types of minerals extracted in
eastern DRC: tin (cassiterite), tantalum (coltan) and tungsten
(wolframite). Coltan is an abbreviation of two mineral ores (columbite–
tantalite) commonly used in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
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